Intrusion detection and the role of the system administrator

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Purpose: The expertise of a system administrator is believed to be important for effective use of intrusion detection systems (IDS). This paper examines two hypotheses concerning the system administrators’ ability to filter alarms produced by an IDS by comparing the performance of an IDS to the performance of a system administrator using the IDS.

Design/methodology/approach: An experiment was constructed were five computer networks are attacked during four days. The experiment assessed difference between made between the output of a system, t detect 9 ysis that is used when attempts to verify. 

Findings: The experiment shows that the system administrator analysing the output from the IDS significantly improves the portion of alarms corresponding to attacks, without decreasing the probability that an attack is detected significantly. In addition, an analysis is made of the types of expertise that is used when output from the intrusion detection system is processed by the administrator.

Originality/value: Previous work, based on interviews with system administrators, has suggested that competent system administrators are important in order to achieve effective IDS solutions. This paper presents a quantitative test of the value system administrators add to the intrusion detection solution.

1. Introduction

When system administrators monitor the security of computer network(s) they often use an intrusion detection system (IDS). The IDS examines events (in network traffic, operating systems, etc.) and raises an alarm if the events are believed to be symptoms of an intrusion. A number of studies investigate IDSs from a technical perspective. These studies typically investigate the technical quality of different solutions in terms of variables such as the probability of attack detection, probability of false alarm, performance constraints or attack coverage (Mell et al. 2003; Biermann 2001). In practice, however, the IDS is not a standalone entity which makes decisions, but a tool used by system administrators. The IDS administrator monitors the IDS output to filter out false alarms and attempts to verify if compromise has occurred, for example, by investigating the affected system directly (Werlinger et al. 2010). Hence, in operational environments the output of an IDS is processed by an administrator who tries to detect and respond to attacks.

IDSs used in practice are tools to support system administrators. However, there are few research efforts that investigate intrusion detection that include system administrators in the investigation. Branlat (2011) studied system administrators under attack during a security exercise and identified a number of issues concerning attack detection in this context, e.g., to identify or guess the intentions of the attackers. Werlinger et al. (2008, 2009, 2010) have acknowledged the important role of administrators and have through interviews explored both usability issues and the need of expertise and human interaction qualitatively. Similar research has been performed by Goodall et al (2004, 2009). The findings in Goodall et al. (2009) are that the work of administrators of IDSs require expertise in computer networks and security as well as a high degree of situated expertise and problem solving ability.

For an intrusion detection solution to be effective, it is of course important that it detects attacks that are made, i.e. it should have a high $P(\text{Alarm}=\text{True} \mid \text{Attack}=\text{True})$. However, it is also important that it has a usable Bayesian detection rate. The Bayesian detection rate is the probability that an alarm which is raised corresponds to an actual attack (Axelsson 2000), i.e. $P(\text{Attack}=\text{True} \mid \text{Alarm}=\text{True})$. False alarms will introduce costs (e.g., due to unnecessary actions taken by IDS administrators) and reduce the faith in the alarms correctness (which might lead to real attacks being overlooked). Hence, the Bayesian detection rate cannot be too low for an effective detection processes.
The high ratio of false positives is a problem with IDSs available today and several ideas that are aimed at reducing the false alarm rate have been presented, e.g., (Sourour et al. 2009) and (Spathoulas & Katsikas 2010). However, the effectiveness of such solutions in operational scenarios remains unclear. Werlinger et al. (2008, 2009, 2010) and Goodall et al. (2004, 2009) have through qualitative studies found that the expertise of system administrators play an important role for the effectiveness of an IDS when they are used in operational settings. In other words, it is believed that a substantial amount of human involvement and expertise is required to produce a high detection rate and at the same time keep the Bayesian detection rate at acceptable levels. Thompson et al. (2007) has assessed how different types of visualisation support a system administrator. However, the authors of this paper are not aware of any quantitative results that test if a system administrator who use and interpret the output of an IDS will produce a higher Bayesian detection rate. Furthermore, no previous work has been found concerning the influence a system administrator’s filtering and analysis have on the probability of detection. This paper examines two hypotheses concerning the effectiveness of an IDS in comparison to an IDS plus an administrator:

Hypothesis one: A competent administrator using an IDS will have a significantly higher Bayesian detection rate than the IDS that is used.

Hypothesis two: A competent administrator using an IDS will have a significantly lower probability of detection than the IDS that is used.

The first hypothesis is based on the idea that administrators will use their expertise to filter the output of the IDS. The second hypothesis is an expected consequence of the filtering process. The idea behind the second hypothesis is that when the administrator filters alarms a portion of the true alarms will be incorrectly dismissed as false alarms.

The research question investigated in this paper stems from the qualitative studies of Goodall et al. (2009) and concern the type of expertise required to use IDSs effectively. It is: Which types of expertise does the administrator use when correct respectively incorrect judgments are made? Of particular interest is the use of domain expertise (in intrusion detection, security, and computer networking) and situated expertise (i.e. local knowledge grounded in the analyst’s environment).

Data for this study was obtained through a four-day-long experiment where a system administrator used an IDS to monitor a set of computer networks under attack by security professionals. From this test it was possible to assess and compare the effectiveness of a system administrator analysing the IDS output to the raw output of the IDS. Section 2 describes the experiment setup in more detail. Section 3 describes the result. In section 4 the result is discussed. Finally, in section 5 conclusions are drawn.

2. Data collection and analysis

The target system used in the experiment is described in section 2.1, the attackers and their attacks are described in section 2.2 and the IDS solutions used in the experiment is described in section 2.3. Section 2.4 describes how quantities were measured and section 2.5 describes how these quantities were compared to test the two hypotheses. Finally, section 2.6 describes how the system administrator was interviewed concerning the use of expertise in decision made during this experiment.

2.1. Target system

The experiment was conducted using a cluster of 160 computers held by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). In this cluster, virtual machines were installed and configured to represent computer networks of five organizations in the electric power industry. Each organisation’s computer network comprised some 30 machines, of which about half were server machines and half were client machines. The five organisations’ computer systems were connected to each other through an internet-like infrastructure containing 44 external servers, primarily web servers.

For all organisations the machines were divided into network zones in a manner representative for a small industrial organization with a demilitarized zone, an office network and an internal “back office” network. The computers within these five organisations’ networks differed significantly, both in terms of software products used and the versions of these software products. The target systems were constructed so that security vulnerabilities varied both between organisations and between the machines within each organisation. This was accomplished by randomizing the software versions to install and the security
patches to apply. Variation was also introduced in terms of memory protection mechanisms used on the different machines. The purpose of this variation was to decrease the probability that a single vulnerability could be exploited on all systems and thus force attackers to use a wider range of attack-methods.

Realistic background traffic and activity is essential when the effectiveness of IDSs is tested (Mell et al. 2003; McHugh 2000; Ranum 2001), but also difficult to produce. In an attempt to create realistic background traffic, user behaviour was simulated on the client machines. This behaviour was emulated using scripts that generated keystroke-combinations that used software installed on the client machines (e.g., the web browser) to perform predefined tasks randomly in time according to a predefined scheme. Within the organisation’s networks the client machines surfed internal and external websites, read email and opened attachments, sent email to other users within and outside the organisation, and accessed and copied shared network files.

2.2. Attackers and their attacks

The attacks in this experiment were performed by staff at the Swedish Armed Forces Network and Telecommunications Unit. The attackers had the broad objective of disturbing the technical infrastructure of the five organisations. They worked on this endeavour during office hours for four days in October 2011. They primarily used the publicly available tool BackTrack 5 as when attacks were executed. They had no prior knowledge of how the five organizations’ computer networks were designed, or where they were placed in the network infrastructure.

The attacks started with a reconnaissance phase where the target systems were identified and probed for vulnerabilities. Attacks and reconnaissance were thereafter performed iteratively during the four days. In total the attackers performed 63 attack actions (including network scans, password guessing, exploitation of configuration flaws and software vulnerability exploitation). On the fourth day the attackers had managed to penetrate machines in the computer networks of two organisations and severely decreased the security of all the networks by compromising their network firewalls.

2.3. Intrusion detection solution

The IDS used in this experiment was an integration of the host-based IDS OSSEC and the network-based IDS Snort. Both are public available open source products commonly used in operational environments. They were installed in the organisations’ computer networks and configured by the administrator who monitored them during the exercise. The administrator spent approximately one week to tune the intrusion detection solution in a manner seen as appropriate. Tuning in this context means to define rules that filter alarms in order to lower the number of false alarms and defining environment-specific signatures (Goodall et al. 2009). The administrator had also been involved in designing and configuring the five organisations computer networks and had a considerable situated expertise of this environment.

Monitoring was performed via a web-based user interface built in Zabbix, a solution for monitoring the availability and performance of computer systems. The administrator received alarms live via a number of predefined views focusing on systems at varying levels of abstraction. In addition to the possibility of viewing these alarms the administrator also had administrative rights on the attacked systems. As the focus of this experiment was the system administrator’s analysis of alarms produced by an IDS, no attempts were made to prevent any of the attacks.

2.4. Measurement instrument

Both the attackers and the administrator maintained logs during the experiment. The attackers logged the attacks performed together with their success and outcome. The administrator logged anomalies which the administrator believed were related to attacks. The administrator also entered records in the log if he believed that a host had been compromised. The output of the IDS alarms was also saved. All logs were time synchronized. The dataset, as well as other data collected during the exercise (e.g., raw network traffic), can be obtained from the authors on request.

2.5. Comparison of detection rates

Hypothesis one concerns the Bayesian detection rate of the IDS alone compared to the IDS administrator. The Bayesian detection rate is the probability that an alarm is raised because of an actual attack. In this
study the attackers documented all attacks they performed and the Bayesian detection rate is assessed as the portion of all alarms which can be connected to any of these attacks. An experienced network security expert was used to judge whether this was the case, based on all information available in the logs.

Hypothesis two concerns the probability of detection, i.e., the probability that an attack will cause an alarm. As for the Bayesian detection rate the attackers’ log was used to compare the performance of the IDS and its administrator. For each entry in the attackers’ log book it was identified if an alarm had been produced because of the actions associated with the attack. The criterion was that at least one alarm should have been raised which could be tied to the actions taken by the attackers. Hence, it was not required that an alarm described everything the attackers did (e.g., all ports that was scanned) in order for the attack to be considered detected.

For both the IDS and the system administrator Bayesian detection rate was obtained as the ratio between the number of alarms raised because of the actions of the attackers and the number of alarms raised in total. The probability of detection was obtained as the ratio between the number of attacks with an alarm tied to it and the number of attacks performed in total.

Fisher’s exact test (Fisher 1922) can be used to assess if there are non-random associations between two categorical variables. In other words, it can be used to tests if categorical variables have distributions that are different. In this paper it is used to test hypotheses one and two by comparing the result of the IDS and its administrator. A significance level of 0.05 is used in this experiment.

2.6. Interviews concerning the use of expertise

To obtain knowledge of the role of expertise in intrusion detection the administrator monitoring the IDS during the experiment was interviewed. Due to the large amount of data collected it was necessary to choose a small data subset to focus on for the interview. Five types of scenarios were identified as interesting in the dataset (cf. Table 1). For each of these handful cases were extracted and brought to the interview to support the discussion. These cases included scenarios where the IDS and/or administrator made correct as well as incorrect judgments.

Table 1. Cases discussed in the interviews.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>An attack is performed</th>
<th>The IDSs reaction</th>
<th>The system administrators reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A YES</td>
<td>Produces a large amount of correct alarms.</td>
<td>Identifies the attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B YES</td>
<td>Produces a large amount of correct alarms.</td>
<td>Labels them as false alarms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C YES</td>
<td>Produces a small amount of correct alarms.</td>
<td>Identifies the attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D YES</td>
<td>Produces a small amount of correct alarms.</td>
<td>Labels them as false alarms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E NO</td>
<td>Produces a large amount of false alarms.</td>
<td>Believe there is an attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F NO</td>
<td>Produces a large amount of false alarms.</td>
<td>Labels them as false alarms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G NO</td>
<td>Produces a small amount of false alarms.</td>
<td>Believe there is an attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H NO</td>
<td>Produces a small amount of false alarms.</td>
<td>Labels them as false alarms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that some of these scenarios only occurred a few times. For example, few cases were found when the system administrator wrongly thought that an attack occurred when the IDS produced few false alarms.

The interviews were semi-structured in the sense that the categorization and cases guided the interviews, but apart from that no formal interview guide with pre-defined questions was used. The interviews were documented with notes which were later confirmed by the respondent.
3. Results

Results of the two hypothesis tests are described in section 3.1. The qualitative results from the interviews are described in section 3.2.

3.1. The performance of the administrator and IDS

During the experiment the administrator produced 70 alarms and the IDS produced 2107 alarms. Meanwhile, the attackers performed 63 actions involving reconnaissance (often network scans) or direct attack (e.g., password guessing). The alarms raised by the IDS pointed to 44 of these actions (i.e., 19 were missed); the alarms raised by the administrator pointed to 37 of these actions (i.e., 26 were missed). The IDS thus outperforms the administrator with when it comes to the probability that an attack is detected (69% vs. 58%). However, with respect to the Bayesian detection rate the system administrator outperformed the IDS. Of the 70 alarms raised by the administrator 40 (57%) was found to be causes of actual attacks; of the 2107 alarms raised by the IDS only 233 (11%) were due to actual attacks. Table 2 summarizes the performance of the IDS and its administrator.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IDS</th>
<th>Administrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarms raised</td>
<td>2107</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of detection</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayesian detection rate</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis one states that the administrator will produce a higher Bayesian detection rate than the IDS. To test if the results can be from the same probability distribution Fisher's exact test (Fisher 1922) is applied on the contingency table. The test shows that the difference is significant (p<0.0001). Hypothesis two states that the administrator will significantly lower probability of detection compared to the IDS. However, Fisher’s exact test does show a significant difference (p=0.2645) between the IDS and system administrator with regards to probability of detection.

3.2. The role of expertise

The interview with the human administrator gave some insight in the reasoning and knowledge that applied when IDS are used. These are summarized below.

A number of the analysed cases correspond to when the administrator was facing several alarms and made a correct decision. This includes scenarios where the administrator correctly identified that the alarms are caused by attack (scenario A in Table 1) and when the administrator correctly identifies them as false alarms (scenario F).

When the administrator labelled these alarms correctly as an attack (scenario A) the primary pieces of information used were the involvement of an external IP-address and the unusually large number of alarms which matched the typical traces of attack-tools. Thus, both situated expertise and knowledge about security is used. In many cases when the administrator correctly identified a comparable amount of alarms as a false positive (scenario F). In these cases the administrator correctly identified the alarms as causes of normal network traffic (general network expertise) or hypothesized that it would be unlikely that the attackers had access to the machine involved (situated expertise). In one case the administrator correctly ignored alarms because they would have originated from attacks the administrator considered the attackers incapable of. In other words, based on knowledge of which vulnerabilities that were present and a good idea of which resources the attacker had the false alarms could be dismissed.

In all cases falling within scenarios B and E (i.e., when there was an attack, the administrator was facing several alarms and made the administrator an incorrect decision) the reason was simply that the alarms were missed by the administrator due to the high amount of alarms that had to be analyzed.

When few alarms were correctly associated with an attack (scenario C) the information used to identify maliciousness was the presence of external IP-addresses and the indirect effects of attacks, e.g., when a
When a smaller group of alarms were correctly dismissed (scenario D and H) the primary reason was that they were few and did not contain any high-priority alarms judged as relevant. In a few cases the administrator faced few or no alarms and incorrectly believed they corresponded to an attack (scenario G). In these cases the reason was that the administrator was misdirected by a single high-priority (but false) alarm. In one of the cases falling within scenario G the reason was an incorrect hypothesis concerning the privileges acquired by the attackers.

4. Discussion

The primary findings of this experiment are described in section 4.1. This experiment has several limitations and its result should therefore be interpreted with care. Some issues with making broad generalizations from this experiment are described in sections 4.2 and 4.3 and some recommendations for further work are given in section 4.4.

4.1. Primary findings

The primary findings in this experiment is that the IDS administrator produces significantly better filtered output than IDS systems do alone, and the administrator’s filtering does not significantly impact the detection rate. As suggested by Goodall et al. (2009), the administrator do so by using situated expertise, general expertise about computer networks, and general expertise about security and attacks. In this experiment the administrator also used knowledge (or guesses) about which attack methods and tools the attackers had access to and would use. Knowledge about the capabilities of the threat agent does not correspond to any of the expertise-types identified by Goodall et al. (2009), but can apparently be effectively used to filter alarm lists.

4.2. Control and sampling of nuisance variables

A number of nuisance variables which can be expected to influence the result are kept constant in this test. This includes variables that are given by the administrator (e.g. the competence), the IDS (e.g. signatures and tuning), and the interface between the administrator and the IDS (e.g. how alarms are visualized). As these are kept constant, the result does not reveal how these influence the result. A reasonable hypothesis is that they all have an impact on the result. For instance, it appears likely that a better tuned IDS would increase the IDS’s Bayesian detection rate and decrease the difference between the administrator and system. On the other hand, the result from this setup is so clear that it appears unlikely that the overall conclusion would be different. In particular, it appears unlikely that the Bayesian detection rate of the system would come close to that of a competent administrator monitoring it.

A number of nuisance variables in this environment were sampled to produce meaningful variation. Meaningful in this case means that they are varied to represent conditions which make the result generalizable to a realistic context. Attacks executed by the attackers varied over the experiment, the configuration of attacked networks and computers differed, and background traffic varied in the experiment.

Since the attackers actually performed attacks with an explicit objective it appears likely that they represent a set of steps which resembles those attacks undertaken when a computer network is attacked. Likewise, the systems under attack were designed to resemble those of typical organizations in the electrical power industry, with different network zones and types of computer machines. However, it is unclear if the somewhat artificial variation influences the result.

An important factor for the Bayesian detection rate is the background traffic. Effort was therefore made to produce background traffic which resembles real actions in the sense that real software applications were used and real requests were made to a diverse set of websites, etc. As stated in (Mell et al. 2003), “there is no such thing as a ‘standard’ network”, which makes it difficult to produce background traffic so that the result is generalizable to a wide context. The scripts used in this study to generate user actions (i.e. background traffic) and other records from the experiment can be obtained from the authors so that readers can assess if they results are accurate for contexts they are interested in.
4.3. The measurement instrument and unit of analysis

The unit of analysis in this study is the entries in the attackers’ log book. Alarms which are a causal effect of the entries in this log book are correct alarms (true positives); alarms that do not match an entry in this log book are incorrect alarms (false positives). In conventional tests of IDSs the unit of analysis is the unit which the IDS bases decisions on, typically a network session or operating system event. This study uses a coarser unit of analysis since the more coarse decisions of the administrator is to be compared to those of the IDS. While intrusive actions are intuitively meaningful as a unit to detect, its definition is less rigid than conventional units of analysis. For instance, some entries in the log book involves hundreds of network sessions (e.g., a network scan) while other only involve one (e.g., a software vulnerability exploitation attempt). While it is possible that another set of attackers (with other opinions on what intrusive behaviour is) would have produced a different log book, it appears unlikely that it would result in a dramatically different result. Manual inspections of a subset of the alarms marked as “false positives” strengthen this belief – no apparent traces could be found to actions taken by the attacker (e.g., to machines they had control over).

This experiment addressed the Bayesian detection rate and the probability of detection. These are two quantities of obvious value for intrusion detection. However, they are not the only qualities that matters. For instance, the ability to identify if an attack was successful and if the computer has been compromised can be important (Mell et al. 2003) since the incident response might depend on the attack’s success and future decisions concerning alarms might be influenced (because the attacker now has a stepping stone). Another aspect to consider is the confidence attributed to alarms that are given. A system administrator (or IDS algorithm) will be confident that an attack is performed in some cases and will be more uncertain in other cases. Since alarms are given with different degrees of confidence, and incident response is likely to be influenced by such confidence ratings, it would be meaningful to test if the confidence assigned to alarms corresponds to their actual correctness.

4.4. Recommendations for future works

The experiment described in this paper is (to the authors’ knowledge) the first documented experiment on IDS administrators’ ability to detect attacks. While this experiment produced statistically significant results on a system administrator’s ability to improve intrusion detection the matter should not be considered as closed. Additional experiments are needed to confirm these findings with other administrators and other environments. In addition, further work should explore the influence different response variables have on a system administrator’s performance. For instance, it could be investigated how important situated expertise is, how important expertise in computer networks is, how important the attacker’s competence is, how important the IDS’s user interface is, how important time pressure is and how important is the tuning of the IDS is.

Analysis of “wild” attacks that an organization is exposed to is also problematic since the available data will be limited to attacks that were observed. To arrange standalone experiments with sufficient ecological validity (i.e., representative for real environments) on IDSs and system administrators can be costly and difficult. Realistic attacks can be difficult to stage in operational settings because of the risk that they influence the business operations negatively. A possible solution to the cost of arranging experiments is to do so in conjunction to cyber security exercises and cyber security competitions. A large number of cyber security competitions are being arranged each year, attracting a considerable number of participants. As outlined in (Sømmedal & Hallberg 2012) such events allows the arranger to control and observe a number of variables that are of relevance to intrusion detection and they offer possibilities to create a fair amount of ecological validity. For instance, the attackers in a security competition can be incentivized to perform stealthy in order to avoid detection. If researchers can influence the setup of such exercises (e.g., so that IDS-usage becomes a part of the competition), data on the human side of intrusion detection should be straightforward to collect.

A natural usage of findings concerning how system administrators’ analyze alarms is to improve tuning practices used to tune intrusion detection systems. In other words, to automate some parts of the system administrator’s analysis. One finding of this experiment was that the system administrator often inspected if there was an external computer involved in the alarm. When only internal computers were involved the system administrator routinely assessed it as a false alarm. As an ad-hoc hypothesis it was tested if this rule
of thumb was meaningful to apply to the output of an IDS. The result is certainly promising. With this rule of thumb applied the total list of IDS alarms shrank from 2107 to 450 while the number of detected attacks remained the same; only 18 alarms caused by attacks were filtered; the Bayesian detection rate increased from 11 percent to 47 percent. Other parts of a system administrator’s analysis are probably more difficult to transform into a generic rule and to gather the necessary data for. However, it appears to be possible to identify generic rules of thumbs that are easy to explain and straightforward to apply by analyzing the methods applied by experienced IDS administrators. Further work could be performed in this direction.

5. Conclusions

This experiment confirms earlier findings concerning the importance of expertise in the use of intrusion detection systems. In this experiment the intrusion detection system administrator achieves a significantly better Bayesian detection rate than the intrusion detection system, and the administrator’s detection rate is not significantly different from the intrusion detection system. An administrator can achieve this effective filtering by using situated expertise, computer networks expertise, computer security expertise, and knowledge about what the threat agent is capable of. Some of these filtering capabilities appear to be possible to implement directly into an IDS.

6. References


